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ABSTRACT 
 
The importance of protecting private property in China has now ascended 
to the same level as that of safeguarding public assets which has traditionally 
been a top priority for socialist nations. This article will firstly and heavily 
expound on the rationale behind the availability and at certain times the 
marginalisation of protecting private property de jure and de facto during 
some momentous stages in modern Chinese history. It will then touch on a 
lingering problem relevant to today‟s Chinese society arising from the 
drainage of state assets, a phenomenon having occurred in the transformation 
process of China‟s economic regimes over the most recent decades. It finally 
argues that while protecting the right to lawful private property is not a matter 
in dispute, pursuing the protection of private property shall in no way lead to 
the weakening of sticking to the core value of justice and egalitarianism, a key 
to ensuring a sound socialist institution. 
 
KEY WORDS 
 
Protection of private property; Constitutional pledge; Justice and 
egalitarianism 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In China‟s 247-article Property Rights Law enacted in 2007, a few lines 
contained in Articles 3 and 4 turn out to be most politically conscious,
1
 as 
they underline the notion of equally protecting private property in 
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1
 In light of China‟s Property Rights Law, market participants in China are ensured to 
be granted equal legal status and vested with equal right of development (art 3, para 
3); the same as in the case of the state or collective organisations, private persons‟ 
property rights will also be protected by law against infringement (art 4).  
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juxtaposition with public assets. This could be viewed as something novel in a 
socialist nation like China where conventionally the public ownership system 
is supposed to invariably occupy a preponderant place. Exalting such kind of 
equal protection is in a certain sense a breakthrough beyond the orthodox 
Marxism on which the socialist ideology embedded in China has long rested.
2
 
As a matter of fact, since the founding of the People‟s Republic of China in 
1949 with the Chinese Communist Party commencing to lead the nation until 
the present time, protecting private property has consistently been exhibited as 
a constitutional pledge, though the actual protection at many times could have 
been perceived as more formal but less substantive.  
The past sixty-odd years had perspicuously witnessed the various forms of 
formation and development of China‟s laws, regulations and policies, which, 
at different times being put forward to meet the demands of the changing 
political and economic situations, had indispensably absorbed the 
philosophies of China‟s two paramount leaders - Mao Zedong (1893-1976) 
and Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997). As of the early 20
th
 century, Mao had 
written profusely on China‟s New Democratic Revolution and on the building 
up of a socialist nation; his thoughts are a crucial source of ideological 
guidance for the Chinese Communist Party. In the post-Mao era, Deng 
masterminded the grand policies of carrying out the economic reform and 
opening-up which started to be implemented in the late 1970s. He led the 
nation embarking on a road towards architecting a socialist society bearing 
unique Chinese features. The past institutional frameworks erected under Mao 
and Deng‟s political influences constituted the most important legacies 
pertaining to the evolution of China‟s economic regimes over all those years 
since the People‟s Republic of China was launched and including the more 
recent reform and opening-up period in Deng‟s time, the ramifications of 
which are still reverberating strongly even down to the present. 
Over the past few decades in the wave of China‟s transformation from a 
centrally planned economy to a market economy as it is today, most Chinese 
people have achieved economic gains, though to varying degrees. Statutorily 
putting into practice the tenet of equal protection of private property by 
relying on the context of what is specifically provided for in this respect in the 
Property Rights Law may have looked more than necessary at the time than at 
                                                     
2
 Ladany asserted in the preface to his book on the Chinese Communist Party and 
Marxism that „Marxism is the soul and inspiration of the Communist Party‟, Laszlo 
Ladany, The Communist Part of China and Marxism, 1921-1985: A Self-Portrait 
(Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1992) ix. Marx articulated in his Manifesto 
of the Communist Party that „[a]bolition of private property‟ is a goal of communism, 
Samuel Moore (trs), Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist 
Party (Moscow, Progress Publishers 1977) 50. 
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any other time in modern Chinese history. This is arguably the cause of the 
importance of protecting private property having been escalated to a level 
unprecedented previously. However, protecting private property ought to be 
distinguishable from installing an impervious wall to the effect that the 
illegally obtained assets in the meantime may also be well protected due to the 
inability in many circumstances to tell a needed distinction which might prove 
difficult in reality.  
How has China‟s institutional framework for protecting private property 
evolved into the state as it currently is? Could the correctness of giving 
protection to private property be ensured both legally and morally 
substantiated? Should the socialist core value of justice and egalitarianism be 
upheld in a more adamant way so that Chinese commoners could share more 
justly the fruits of the nation‟s economic success?  
These are the questions which may plague many people‟s mind at all 
times. 
 
2. THE NEW DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: MAINTAINING 
THE STATUS QUO OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 
 
China‟s New Democratic Revolution roughly spanned the first half of the 
20
th
 century in which the People‟s Republic of China was established in 1949, 
displacing the Republic of China (then controlled by the Chinese Nationalist 
Party) in Mainland China. It is in fact a terminology derived from the 
bifurcation made by Mao Zedong.  
In his work on the Chinese revolution, Mao underlined the pivotal role 
played by the New Democratic Revolution (as opposed to the Old Democratic 
Revolution preceding it) in modern China‟s democratic revolutionary process 
which had been described by him as an integral part of the world socialist 
revolution.
3
 Even at the time well before the Chinese Communist Party gained 
the ruling power in China, Mao had pointed out that the terminal objective of 
the Chinese revolution is to attain socialism and communism, opining that 
when the conditions are ripe it would be the task of the Chinese Communist 
Party to accomplish the transition for China to enter into the phase of a 
socialist revolution from the New Democratic Revolution.
4
 However, he 
                                                     
3
 See generally Zedong Mao, „Xin min zhu zhi yi lun‟ (The New Democracy) in Mao 
Zedong xuan ji di er juan (The Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol 2) (Chinese, 
Beijing, People‟s Press 1991) 666-672. 
4
 Zedong Mao, „Zhong guo ge ming he zhong guo gong chan dang‟ (The Chinese 
Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party) in Mao Zedong xuan ji di er juan (The 
Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol 2) (Chinese, Beijing, People‟s Press 1991) 650-
651. 
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positioned the New Democratic Revolution, the starting point of which is the 
outbreak of the May Fourth Student Movement in 1919, as an indispensable 
stage that China must go through on its way to become a socialist nation.
5
 In 
his view, China‟s New Democratic Revolution is a bourgeoisie democratic 
revolution but led by the proletariat who therefore must always prepare to 
start building up a socialist society once the process of the New Democratic 
Revolution is complete.
6
  
Mao worked out a set of economic canons tailored to the period of 
China‟s New Democratic Revolution. He submitted the ideas of maintaining 
the co-existence of three specific forms of ownership system („state 
ownership‟, „private ownership‟, and „collective ownership‟) and of ensuring 
that legitimate private property would be protected.
7
 He accentuated that the 
Chinese nation to be founded as the result of the success of the New 
Democratic Revolution would be a new type of democratic republic differing 
from those capitalist republics in Europe and America and also not akin to a 
Soviet-style totalitarian state.
8
 He foresaw that in the new Chinese nation that 
was coming into being, the state ownership system would dominate all 
spheres of economic life pertinent to core national and civilian interests;
9
 the 
private, capitalist-style economy could continue to exist, provided that it 
would do no disservice to the state-owned economic system;
10
 the 
bourgeoisie‟s private property would not be confiscated;11 each peasant would 
be given a plot of land as his private property.
12 
  
Mao‟s theories greatly impacted the economic policies of the New 
Democratic Revolution subsequently formulated and executed in the form of 
law by the Chinese Communist Party. Typical examples are the Blueprint for 
Land Law of China 1947, the Land Reform Law 1950, and the Common 
                                                     
5
 Ibid 647. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Zedong Mao, „Lun lian he zheng fu‟ (The Coalition Government) in Mao Zedong 
xuan ji di san juan (The Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol 3) (Chinese, Beijing, 
People‟s Press 1991) 1058-1059. See also Qiaomu Hu, „Hu Qiaomu hui yi Mao 
Zedong‟ (Hu Qiaomu‟s reminiscences of Mao Zedong) in Shujun Zhang and Sheng 
Qi (eds) Hong se jue ce – zhong guo gong chan dang zhong da hui yi shi lu shang 
juan (Decision-making in the Revolution – the Documented Important Meetings of 
the Chinese Communist Party, Vol 1) (Chinese, Changsha, Hunan People‟s Press 
2006) 197. 
8
 Mao (n 3) 675. 
9
 Ibid 678. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid.  
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Principles 1949 which filled the void left by the absence of a formal Chinese 
Constitution which had not come into existence until 1954.   
Against the background of the Blueprint for Land Law of China 1947 and 
the Land Reform Law 1950, a land reform movement led by the Chinese 
Communist Party was carried out in China‟s rural areas during the period of 
around 1947 to 1953.
13
 It gave rise to rural landlords deprived of their land 
which was then distributed to the peasants with little or without land and to 
the affected landlords alike.
14
 Consequently, all Chinese peasants, regardless 
of their economic status, became able to live on their privately-held land.  
Pursuant to the Common Principles 1949, China‟s feudal and semi-feudal 
land ownership system at the time would be abolished and changed into a 
peasant-owned land system;
15
 the assets of the state and co-operatives would 
be protected;
16
 the economic interests and private property of workers, 
peasants and the bourgeoisie would be protected also;
17
 the state would 
centrally control and run, under a state-run economic system which is socialist 
in nature, all the industries pertinent to national economic lifelines and core 
civilian interests;
18
 the co-operative economic sector, which is semi-socialist 
in nature, would constitute an important segment in China‟s national 
economy;
19
 developing the private-sector economy would be encouraged, 
given that it could benefit national and civilian interests;
20
 and the national 
capitalist economy taking the form of a collaboration between state funds and 
private capital would be permitted to exist as well.
21
 
It is not difficult to figure out at this point that the Common Principles 
together with the Blueprint for Land Law and the Land Reform Law had 
explicitly laid out Mao‟s expectation in regard of the economic policies 
applied to the New Democratic Revolution, a period that would last prior to 
China setting off for its socialist destination: property ownership takes 
diversified forms; private property is protected; all peasants have their own 
land; private economic sectors would not head for considerable debilitation.  
                                                     
13
 See generally Richard Phillips, China since 1911 (London, Macmillan 1996) 165-
166. 
14
 Blueprint for Land Law of China 1947; Land Reform Law 1950, arts 2 and 10. See 
also generally Suinian Liu and Qungan Wu (eds), China’s Socialist Economy – An 
Outline History (1949-1984) (Beijing, Beijing Review 1986) 46-54. 
15
 Common Principles art 3. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Common Principles art 28. 
19
 Common Principles art 29. 
20
 Common Principles art 30. 
21
 Common Principles art 31. 
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Although a fine line may have to be trod between upholding the 
importance of a public ownership system and ensuring the sustained 
enjoyment of the right to private property, the general framework established 
at the time called for no immediacy of taking a huge leap forward towards 
socialism from the path of the New Democratic Revolution. In this 
connection, the status quo was not supposed to be distorted, but would be 
maintained until the New Democratic Revolution could continuously and 
more naturally complete its well-designed destiny.  
However, the ongoingness of the New Democratic Revolution eventually 
failed to have a lengthy life span; it came to an end in 1953.
22
  With the 
promulgation of China‟s first Constitution in 1954, the weather vane changed; 
the building up of socialism became the nation‟s main mission. 
 
3. THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION CAMPAIGN: BUILD-
ING UP THE DOMINACE OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 
 
The formation of the political and legal basis 
 
The arrival of the new Chinese republic led by the Chinese Communist 
Party was in the teeth of a treacherous international environment where in the 
1950s the mainstream ideology embraced in most Western nations was in 
diametrical contradiction to communism. Isolation and animosity from the 
West deeply engulfed China which was eager to win wide international 
recognition beyond the limited scope of a few socialist friends. The situation 
became worse after it joined the Korean War in the early 1950s.  As a new 
sovereign state whose economic strength and technological capacity lagged 
far behind those of western countries, China had little experience of carrying 
out modern economic development and hammering out the necessary political 
and legal institutions. Foreign aid must be sought; but apart from the Soviet 
Union, few allies could competently be relied upon at the time. The world 
then had two clearly divided camps – „a capitalist camp‟ and „a communist 
camp‟; while ideologically belonging to the latter, China had not been able to 
instantly acquire the trust of the Soviet Union, which, under the leadership of 
Joseph Stalin at the time, was at the top rung of the world communist front.
23
  
                                                     
22
 Qiufeng Ji and Hwei-shing Cheng  (trs), Immanuel CY Hsu, The Rise of Modern 
China (Vol 2) (Chinese, Hong Kong, The Chinese University Press 2002) 655. 
23
 See generally Qiming Sun, Zhong su guan xi shi mo (History of Sino-Soviet 
Relations) (Chinese, Shanghai, Shanghai People‟s Press 2002) 119-121; Zhihua Shen, 
Zhong su tong meng de jing ji bei jing: 1948-1953 (The Economic Background of the 
Sino-Soviet Alliance: 1948-1953) (Chinese, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Institute of 
Asia-Pacific Studies/The Chinese University of Hong Kong 2000) 2-22. 
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Chinese leaders understood that in order to secure Stalin‟s support, they 
would have to succumb to the hierarchical authoritativeness asserted by the 
Soviet Union and to learn humbly from Russia‟s experience across a wide 
spectrum of social life.
24
    
On 14 February 1950, in the presence of Mao and Stalin, the Sino-Soviet 
Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid, along with other agreements 
on bilateral sovereignty and economic interests, were signed in Moscow 
between the two nations.
25
 The Treaty would run for thirty years.
26
 Articles 4 
and 5 of the Treaty clearly illustrate the general principles to be adhered to by 
the two nations with respect to the alliance created. By Article 4, the two 
nations would „consult each other in regard to all important international 
problems affecting the common interests of the Soviet Union and China, 
being guided by the interests of the consolidation of peace and universal 
security‟.27 Under Article 5, the two nations pledged „to develop and 
consolidate economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and China, 
to render each other all possible economic assistance, and to carry out the 
necessary economic co-operation‟.28 Although divergence of opinions, 
skirmishes and mistrust between the two communist parties were far from 
being played down outright, forging a strategic alliance like that was 
undoubtedly an epoch-making event in the history of Sino-Soviet relations.
29
  
Stalin believed that against the backdrop of the ongoing Cold War, China‟s 
accession into the socialist camp would facilitate securing and enhancing 
Russia‟s strategic interest in Asia against the US.30  For China, the Sino-
Soviet alliance would enable it to gain an assured access to the Soviet Union‟s 
comprehensive assistance.
31
  The bond established was emblematic of a 
coming era in which China would garner the political basis for heading 
towards socialism by switching from carrying on the New Democratic 
Revolution to engaging in a large scale process of Sovietisation in order to 
construct a socialist society within a short space of time.
32
  
                                                     
24
 See generally Sun, (n 23) 121-123; Paul Auster and Lydia Davis (trs), Jean 
Chesneaux, China: The People’s Republic, 1949-1976 (New York, Pantheon Books 
1979) 29. 
25
 Sun (n 23) 139-140.  
26
 See Peter Jones and Sian Kevill, China and the Soviet Union 1949-1984 (New 
York, Facts on File Publications 1985) 2. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 See generally Sun (n 23) 142-144; Shen (n 23) 22-50.  
30
 Shen (n 29) 45-46. 
31
 Ibid 50. 
32
 See generally Chesneaux (n 24) 56. 
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In this context, spearheaded by the rural collectivisation and urban 
industrialisation movements, a socialist transformation campaign started in 
China in the 1950s. The Constitution 1954 timely laid down the required legal 
basis for launching the campaign, manifesting it as gradually achieving the 
socialist industrialisation and realising a socialist transformation in agriculture 
and craftsmanship sectors and in those industrial and commercial sectors 
whose essential nature is capitalism.
33
  
From the perspective of who would exercise control over the means of 
production which is crucial to a nation‟s development, the Constitution 1954 
mentions four types of ownership system – (a) state ownership; (b) co-
operative ownership; (c) individual labourer‟s private ownership; and (d) 
individual capitalist‟s private ownership.34 Under the Constitution 1954, the 
state-run economy (the socialist economy in the form of all people‟s 
ownership) is displayed as being in the most prominent position on the 
hierarchy of all the economic systems operating in China at the time;
35
 the co-
operative economy is prescribed to be of a socialist or semi-socialist 
character.
36
 Thus, in principle both the state-run economy and the co-
operative economy could fall into the purview of the socialist public 
ownership regime.  
By the Constitution 1954, protection would be given to a variety of 
private property right, including individual peasants‟ private land ownership 
right,
37
 individual peasants and other individual labourers‟ right of private 
ownership over their means of production,
38
 individual capitalists‟ right of 
private ownership over their means of production and capital,
39
 private 
individuals‟ right over their lawful incomes, savings, houses, etc,40 as well as 
private individuals‟ succession right to private property.41 However, the said 
protection ought not to be construed as tantamount to encouraging the 
development of private ownership economy. Conversely, in light of the 
Constitution 1954, the agricultural sector, the craftsmanship sector, and the 
industrial and commercial sectors are the target of rectification. The 
agricultural and craftsmanship sectors would face collectivisation.
42
 As for the 
industrial and commercial sectors, their private ownership would eventually 
                                                     
33
 Constitution 1954, preamble, para 2. 
34
 Constitution 1954, art 5. 
35
 Constitution 1954, art 6, para 1. 
36
 Constitution 1954, art 7, para 1. 
37
 Constitution 1954, art 8, para 1. 
38
 Ibid; and Constitution, art 9, para 1. 
39
 Constitution 1954, art 10, para 1. 
40
 Constitution 1954, art 11. 
41
 Constitution 1954, art 12. 
42
 Constitution 1954, art 7-9. 
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be dismantled and replaced by the all people‟s ownership system.43 In other 
words, any private economy would be substituted with the socialist public 
ownership regime, though perhaps in a gradual and less traumatised fashion. 
And once these could become a reality, the integrity of the rights to private 
property should have unavoidably weathered some stormy changes, the 
effects of which could have been far-reaching to the nation and to the 
individual citizens affected for a hardly estimably long time in their lives and 
in history. 
 
Rural collectivisation and urban industrialisation  
 
Carrying out the socialist transformation campaign in China was 
predicated on the presumption that under a well organised public ownership 
regime, the society‟s capital, natural and human resources could be mobilised 
within the shortest time and utilised in the nation‟s best interests; it would be 
far less difficult to accomplish a grand action like this under the auspice of a 
socialist system where a sole ruling party would face no endless debates in the 
parliament and no ubiquitous interference of opposition parties as what 
happened in the capitalist West.   
As to the carrying out of collectivisation and industrialisation, Soviet 
Russia had precedents. Collectivisation and industrialisation, the two themes 
characteristically embodied in Soviet socialism, was a prelude to this red 
empire‟s crusade to becoming a socialist superpower in the mid 20th century 
on the basis of exacting a vast transformation of private property in Soviet 
society. Being the first socialist nation in the history of mankind, the Soviet 
Union was a pioneer experimenter in engineering rural collectivisation,
44
 
which put into practice the Bolsheviks‟ theory about the superiority of 
collective agriculture and their inclination towards „regarding private 
ownership of land as a major obstacle to the victory of socialism‟.45 The result 
was that numerous collective farms were established, efficaciously 
smothering private agriculture in the Soviet Union.
46
  Private rights and 
interests belonging to landlords and wealthy peasants (the „kulaks‟) were 
callously quashed,
47
 thus perfectly matching Stalin‟s expectation of the 
„elimination of the kulaks as a class‟.48 On the other hand, in the minds of the 
                                                     
43
 Constitution 1954, art 10, para 2. 
44
 See generally Peter Kenez, A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the 
End (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1999) 88. 
45
 Ibid 84. 
46
 See generally ibid 85-87. 
47
 See generally ibid. 
48
 Ibid 86. 
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Bolshevik leaders, the industrialisation focusing on heavy industries was their 
„primary task‟.49 The accomplishment of the industrialization was lauded by 
them as „the best proof of the superiority of their political, social, and 
economic system‟, and they revelled in the conviction that the Soviet 
economy „was capable of catching up with the advanced capitalist West‟.50 By 
1937, private agriculture had become obsolete in the Soviet Union;
51
 the 
existence of private enterprises in industrial sectors had virtually ceased.
52
  
China wished to push through its rural collectivisation and urban 
industrialisation also. But the approach deployed was comparatively more 
moderate. Chinese leaders initially made a less ambitious estimation, 
reckoning that it might take fifteen, twenty or even thirty years to complete 
China‟s New Democratic Revolution before a solid economic foundation (in 
terms of achieving the industrialisation in particular) could have been laid out 
for the nation to effect an all-encompassing, one-step transformation into 
socialism.
53
 However, the challenging global and peripheral situation forced 
Chinese leaders to size up the original prediction again; then they were 
stunned to become cognisant of the fact that developing national defence must 
be prioritised, and this would critically hinge on a modern heavy industry the 
facilities and techniques of which China possessed all but scant command at 
the time.
54
 On realising China‟s national industrialisation, private 
entrepreneurs were deemed not capable of making any significant 
contribution; the backward private agriculture was viewed as an ostensible 
hindrance.
55
  
In 1953, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party endorsed 
an official order released to the public - the General Policy Guidelines for the 
Transitional Period, unveiling a new central plank of government policy 
which denoted an important change of direction made to the long-term 
development roadmap prepared for the ensuing decades.  The „transitional 
period‟ is depicted in this document as a time span roughly ranging from the 
founding of the People‟s Republic of China onwards to the accomplishment 
                                                     
49
 Ibid 89, 91. 
50
 Ibid 92. 
51
 Ibid 85. 
52
 J M Roberts, Shorter Illustrated History of the World (Oxford, Helicon 1993) 507. 
53
 Huamin Gao, Chong jing shi xian guo jia gong ye hua – yu guo du shi qi zong lu 
xian (Anticipating the Realization of National Industrialization – the General Policy 
Guidelines for the Transitional Period) in Suhua Zhang (ed) Mao Zedong yu zhong 
gong dang shi zhong da shi jian (Mao Zedong and Major Historical Events of the 
Chinese Communist Party) (Chinese, Beijing, Central Literature Press 2001) 269. 
54
 Ibid 270-271. See also generally Phillips (n 13) 172-173. 
55
 Gao (n 53) 272. 
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of a socialist transformation in the nation.
56
 In the context of this document, 
the task of the Chinese Communist Party in the transitional period is to 
gradually accomplish the socialist industrialisation and realise a socialist 
transformation in agricultural and craftsmanship sectors and in the private 
industrial and commercial sectors within a rather long period of time.
57
 Doing 
so is to let the system of socialist public ownership over the means of 
production eventually form the sole basis of China‟s national economy.58  
While the estimated length of the transitional period prescribed in that 
document is around fifteen years commencing from 1953,
59
 the actual 
development turned out to be far more rapid than originally projected. In 
1957, a massive rural collectivisation became reality.
60
 By the end of 1956, 
the socialist transformation of private industrial and commercial sectors had 
basically been accomplished.
61
 All the targets of socialist transformation set 
out in the General Policy Guidelines for the Transitional Period have been met 
in 1956; such an outcome exerted a profound effect on China‟s economy and 
national strength, and also on treating private property.
62
   
The engine that drove China‟s socialist transformation was initially 
ignited in rural areas early in the 1950s, since the small-scale, individualised 
private agriculture was most susceptible to surrendering to a large-scale, 
collectivised production fashion.
63
 China‟s rural collectivisation has in fact 
undergone several development stages, ultimately culminating in the 
widespread establishment of „the people‟s commune‟ from 1958 onwards.64 
The people‟s commune had once been highly regarded at the time since it 
supposedly conformed to the socialist utopian ideals in terms of having 
available the common ownership of property and the capacity to perform a 
                                                     
56
 General Policy Guidelines for the Transitional Period, Part I, Item VI. See also 
Gao, ibid 274; Yihua Jiang, Guo du shi qi li lun yu shi jian qu dai xin min zhu zhu yi li 
shi bei jing de yi xiang kao cha (An investigation on the historical background against 
which the theories and practices of the Transitional Period replaced those of the New 
Democracy) in Jingping Wu and Siyan Xu (eds) Yi jiu wu ling nian dai de zhong guo 
(China in the 1950s) (Chinese, Shanghai, Fudan University Press 2006)  50. 
57
 General Policy Guidelines for the Transitional Period (n 56); Gao (n 56); Jiang (n 
56). 
58
 General Policy Guidelines for the Transitional Period (n 56); Gao (n 56); Jiang (n 
56) 50-51.  
59
 General Policy Guidelines for the Transitional Period (n 56); Gao (n 56). 
60
 Hsu (n 22) 661. 
61
 Xing Su, Xin zhong guo jing ji shi (The Economic History of New China) (Chinese, 
Beijing, Central Party School Press 1999) 314. 
62
 Ibid 248. 
63
 Liu and Wu (n 14) 129.  
64
 Hsu (n 22) 661-663.   
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comprehensive range of social functions.
65
  The emergence of the people‟s 
commune ended Chinese peasants‟ private land ownership and also halted 
their ownership over other means of production. Rural land ownership 
became a collectively-owned property right; this means that at that time only 
by working for rural collective organisations could Chinese peasants use the 
land to carry out agricultural production.
66
  
In lockstep with the proceeding of the rural collectivisation, the urban 
industrialisation was carried out as another aspect of the socialist 
transformation campaign targeting private enterprises in Chinese cities. 
Private entrepreneurs had to give up or at least to significantly decontrol their 
business as they were „encouraged‟ to collaborate with the government by 
having their privately held enterprise converted into a kind of joint venture-
like business in which the state would hold a certain percentage of equity and 
also step in to manage.
67
  The socialist transformation of private enterprises 
across all business lines was achieved in China in 1956; this was evinced on 
the countrywide basis by the establishment, in the industrial and commercial 
sectors, of joint venture-like enterprises owned by the state and private 
entrepreneurs who could retain some stake in the business, and by the 
formation of co-operatives in the craftsmanship sector which could then count 
as being owned collectively and equally by businessmen and/or workers other 
than by private individuals.
68
 By 1966, all the said joint venture-like 
enterprises evolved into one hundred per cent state-owned, state-run 
enterprises, or became collectively-owned enterprises; in both cases, the 
traces of capitalism were ironed out and the enterprises concerned were seen 
to have been fully integrated into the socialist public ownership system.
69
  
                                                     
65
 Suhua Zhang, Zai li xiang yu xian shi jiao zhi de shi jie li – yu da yue jin he ren min 
gong she hua yun dong (In a world where dream and reality intertwine – the 
movements of the „Great Leap Forward‟ and the People‟s Communes) in Zhang (n 
53) 328-329.  
66
 Su (n 61) 434;  
67
 See generally Carl Riskin, China’s Political Economy – the Quest for Development 
Since 1949 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988) 95-99. 
68
 See Su (n 61) 313-315, 335.  
69
 See generally Fang Li „Xi wo guo cai chan quan jie gou de er yuan xing te zheng‟ 
(An analysis on the feature of dualism of China‟s property rights structure) (Chinese) 
<http://www.cntheory.com/news/Llzh/2009/1010/0910109231009H9FH77295CH0F
FK7F1.html> accessed 10 June 2013; Mengfu Huang „Qu xiao ding qi gong si he 
ying che di zhuan wei guo ying‟ (Discontinuing dividend payments – thoroughly 
converting those businesses jointly owned and run by the state and private 
entrepreneurs into wholly state-run enterprises) (Chinese) 
<http://lz.book.sohu.com/chapter-18387-114210315.html> accessed 10 June 2013. 
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The rural collectivisation, along with the urban industrialisation that was 
carried out through nationalising private enterprises in urban regions, could 
hardly be interpreted as something other than a determined action taken by the 
Chinese government to switch into a fast lane towards the full-scale 
implementation of socialism. The accomplishment of the socialist 
transformation campaign signified that China had categorically entered the 
phase of socialism. In the ensuing decades, the nation had operated within the 
institutional framework of a centrally planned economy until the early 1990s 
when being guided under Deng Xiaoping‟s theory China abandoned the 
planned economy model and adopted a socialist market economy system. 
However, viewed in a historical perspective, the positive role played by 
China‟s socialist transformation campaign ought not to be unfairly 
underestimated. The highly organised Chinese peasants played an 
irreplaceable role in accumulating a significant part of the needed funds for 
developing China‟s industries. In that sense, the rural collectivisation made a 
great contribution to China‟s industrialisation scheme which was brought to 
fruition where a series of backbone industrial sectors surfaced, and in 
particular a staunch national defence became available constituting an all-too-
vital deterrent to any likely foreign invasions. A strong military ensured 
China‟s building up of socialism a relatively peaceful environment; a 
preliminary industrial self-sufficiency formed part of the primary foundation 
for the nation‟s economic take-off in the later time when the reform and 
opening-up policy was overwhelmingly dispensed. But of course it would not 
be possible to make these achievements at no expense to individuals‟ rights to 
their private property and interests which are known to have been disregarded 
or sacrificed to varying extents, either willingly or otherwise. 
 
4. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PLEDGE  
 
While China sweepingly completed the socialist transformation of its 
economy in the 1950s, protecting private property as a constitutional pledge 
has never been missed in any Chinese Constitution historically. But in the 
centrally planned economy era, China‟s emphasis on keeping up the 
dominance of public ownership economy generally frustrated the 
development of the private economy and consequently resulted in the respect 
for and protection of private property given far less sufficient weight. A 
tendency of striking out such an imbalance could be singled out from the 
relevant provisions set forth in the three Chinese Constitutions that were 
promulgated before China instituted the reform and opening-up policy in the 
late 1970s.  
Despite the fact that the cardinal stance over the protection of legitimate 
private property remains the same as shown in these three Constitutions, ie the 
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Constitution 1954,
70
 the Constitution 1975,
71
 and the Constitution 1978,
72
 in 
comparison with what is stipulated in the Constitution 1954, the permitted 
forms of ownership system of the means of production prescribed in the 
Constitution 1975 and the Constitution 1978 are narrowed down to two 
choices only – (i) socialist all people‟s ownership, and (ii) socialist collective 
ownership.
73
 And under the Constitution 1975 and the Constitution 1978, the 
state-run economy is prescribed as the leading force of the national 
economy.
74
 Thus it could be well inferred from these three Constitutions 
(especially the latter two) that standing by the dominance of public ownership 
gained apparent ascendancy over safeguarding privately held assets during 
that period. While in principle the constitutional pledge of protecting private 
property had not been formally retracted, the actual role played by it had 
certainly in large part been marginalised at the time.  
With the forms of ownership system becoming obviously lopsided, the 
centrally planned economy appeared not able to yield abundant economic 
fruits as having been longed for from a socialist society. However, Chinese 
leaders have never ceased in their endeavour to find a suitable route for the 
nation‟s development. Deng Xiaoping tried hard to uncover the long-term 
mystique of what socialism really ought to be.
75
  
Robert Owen (an utopian socialist) used to have his following dream of 
socialism: „What ideas individuals may attach to the term “Millennium” I 
know not; but I know that society may be formed so as to exist without crime, 
without poverty, with health greatly improved, with little, if any misery, and 
with intelligence and happiness increased a hundredfold: and no obstacle 
whatsoever intervenes at this moment except ignorance to prevent such a state 
of society from becoming universal.‟76 Other critiques portrait the 
characteristics of socialism as „egalitarianism‟ staying away from „those 
practices and institutions which undermine or stifle sociability and co-
operation‟.77 
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71
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 Keqin Tian (ed), Deng Xiaoping li lun gai lun (An Outline of Deng Xiaoping 
Theory) (Chinese, Beijing, Higher education Press 1999) 50. 
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owen.com/quotes.htm> accessed 10 June 2013. 
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But Deng‟s probe is more down-to-earth. In accordance with his findings, 
the principal task of socialism is to emancipate and augment productivity;
78
 
building up socialism should follow a fundamental direction towards 
eradicating exploitation and getting rid of extremes of wealth and poverty,
79
 in 
order that all Chinese people could prosper eventually.
80
 In his view, a market 
economy is not necessarily at odds with socialism; regardless of how it is 
named (a planned economy or a market economy), the term itself used by a 
socialist nation to describe its primary economic institution is not essential, so 
far as under such an institution the nation‟s economic growth could be 
sustained in a fast and healthy way resulting in a marked improvement of 
people‟s living standards on an overall basis.81 Meanwhile, he was clearly 
aware of the difficulty of achieving common prosperity, and conceded that 
realising common prosperity in China would not be a quick and easy process 
but might take a very long time.
82
 He thereby posited that calling for 
immediate, absolute egalitarianism would not really make sense; certain 
persons and regions in China should be allowed to become rich in the first 
place well ahead of others, but the final objective would be unchanged, ie 
avoiding polarisation of wealth and achieving common prosperity.
83
    
Deng‟s theory formed the core of China‟s prevailing doctrines of building 
up a socialist nation with Chinese characteristics, the success of which has 
been well proved by China‟s economic take-off under the context of 
executing the economic reform and opening-up policy which had had Deng‟s 
firmest support unfailingly. The formation and implementation of Deng‟s 
theory also effectively gave rise to a statutory re-adjustment of China‟s 
institutional framework for governing public and non-public ownership 
economies. The Chinese Constitution currently in force was originally 
promulgated in 1982; it underwent amendment in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004, 
respectively, each time begetting an increment in the status and 
momentousness of China‟s non-public ownership economy enshrined in the 
constitutional mandate.  
Pursuant to the original version of the Constitution 1982, the socialist 
public ownership system of the means of production, encompassing the forms 
of all people‟s ownership and collective ownership, is the basis of China‟s 
                                                     
78
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socialist economic system;
84
 the state-run economy falls into the category of 
the socialist economic system in the form of all people‟s ownership and is 
viewed as the leading force of China‟s economy;85 the rural co-operative 
economy led by the people‟s communes or by productive co-operatives is 
classified as part of China‟s socialist economic system in the form of 
collective ownership;
86
 the urban co-operative economy in the sectors of, eg 
craftsmanship, manufacturing industry, commerce, and services, etc, is also 
categorised as part of China‟s socialist economic system in the form of 
collective ownership;
87
 the economy based on the form of sole proprietorship 
in urban and rural areas, given that it could operate within the allowed 
business scope prescribed by the law, is deemed a supplement to China‟s 
socialist public ownership economy;
88
 and on the basis of socialist public 
ownership, China operates a planned economy system.
89
  
Under an amendment made in 1988, the existence and development of the 
private ownership economy within the boundaries prescribed by the law is 
permitted; the private ownership economy constitutes a complement to 
China‟s socialist public ownership economy; the state protects any legitimate 
rights and interests relating to the private ownership economy.
90
 With the 
amendments made in 1993, the original term „state-run economy‟ is changed 
to „state-owned economy‟;91 the wording „the people‟s communes and 
productive co-operatives‟ is deleted, and China‟s rural co-operative economy 
is redefined as the one being run under a farmland contracting system;
92
 and 
with the abandonment of the centrally planned economy model impliedly 
announced, a socialist market economy system is explicitly declared to be 
implemented in the nation.
93
  
Relative to the amendments made in 1988 and 1993, the amendments 
made in 1999 could be viewed as a giant jump forward for establishing a new 
framework that would take in more diversified forms of ownership system. In 
light of these amendments, China is positioned as still being at a preliminary 
development stage of socialism; it sticks to an economic system with its 
public ownership economy as the leading force, but it would also develop 
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other types of economy in different forms of ownership.
94
 In such a scenario, 
the importance of the private ownership economy based on sole proprietorship 
or private business has been greatly enhanced: instead of being described as 
merely a supplement to the nation‟s public ownership economy, such kind of 
non-public ownership economy is re-named as an important constituent of 
China‟s socialist market economy system, and the relating legitimate rights 
and interests are under state protection.
95
 Furthermore, under the Constitution 
amended in 2004, developing non-public ownership economies in China will 
not only be supported but also be particularly encouraged;
96
 here, the term 
„encouraged‟ is a way of expression never used in the past.  
With the non-public ownership economy in China being strongly 
countenanced, various productive capacities have been liberated leading to the 
creation of more and more privately held assets. Hence, the availability of 
substantively protecting private property seems more critical than ever in 
some people‟s eyes. In fact, as far as protecting private property is concerned, 
specific stipulations in this regard are discernable from all the Chinese 
Constitutions so far promulgated, no matter it relates to the period before or to 
that after China‟s economic reform and opening-up policy began to be 
implemented. Under the Constitution 1954, the Constitution 1975, the 
Constitution 1978, and the Constitution 1982 as amended in 1988, 1993 and 
1999, it is said that China protects the legitimate incomes, savings, houses, 
and various consumption goods that belong to private individuals.
97
 But 
noteworthily, this expression has been superseded by a provision brought into 
effect with the passage of the amendments made to the Constitution 1982 in 
2004: immediately following what is set forth in article 12 that the state 
protects socialist public assets which are particularised as „sacred‟ and 
„inviolable‟,98 article 13 reads that an individual citizen‟s right over his 
legitimately obtained private property shall not be impinged upon;
99
 the state 
protects an individual citizen‟s private property rights and inheritance 
rights.
100
 Here, the Constitution is not using the word „sacred‟ to place more 
conspicuously in the foreground the protection of private property. But it can 
be generally assumed that safeguarding private property against the menace of 
impairment, sabotage and unlawful deprivation has since then been attached 
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great importance most seriously, especially with the Property Rights Law 
coming into force.  
 
5. DRAINAGE OF STATE ASSETS 
 
The constitutional pledge has ensured that private property in socialist 
China is now under state protection in the same way as public property. The 
Property Rights Law reinforces this pledge from the perspective of giving 
prominence to equally protecting private property relative to public assets. 
Such protection is, however, meant to be provided to legitimate private 
property only.
101
 The current dilemma is to make sure that protection is indeed 
rendered to the lawfully obtained private property. What happens in reality is 
that a large part of amassed private assets could have come from illegally 
drained or siphoned state assets. Such drainage through defrauding state assets 
largely occurred in the course of China‟s transformation of its state-owned 
enterprises aimed at setting up a modern enterprise system.  
The widespread establishment of state-owned enterprises and their 
crushing presence in China‟s national economy could be attributed to the 
socialist transformation campaign and the industrialisation movement 
completed in the 1950s.
102
 From the standpoint of modern corporate 
management, some critics assert that those old-style, state-owned enterprises 
have „no production and decision-making rights‟,103 and apart from lack of 
autonomy they have obvious defects of low efficiency and lack of 
performance-related rewards and stimulus.
104
  For this reason, the reform of 
China‟s state-owned enterprises commenced in the late 1970s; it was initially 
aimed at providing enterprises with more autonomy and incentives, with the 
ultimate objective put up as hammering out a modern enterprise system in the 
country.
105
 The entire process of reforming state-owned enterprises has been 
described by some scholars as „from profit retention to a fixed-quota contract 
for profit or loss, and to the enterprise responsibility system, then to the 
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shareholding system, and finally to the modern enterprise system 
experiment‟.106   
At the Third Plenary Session of the 14
th
 Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party held in 1993, it was strongly pronounced that one of the 
salient features of China‟s socialist market economy system is „to have the 
market play[s] a fundamental role in the allocation of resources under the 
country‟s macro-control‟;107 it was determined at that meeting to „establish [a] 
modern enterprise system with clear property rights, clear powers and 
responsibilities, separation of government from enterprises and scientific 
management measures that meets the requirements of the market economy‟.108 
For the purpose of setting up some more explicit and manageable targets of 
reforming state-owned enterprises, a consensus was reached at the Fourth 
Plenary Session of the 15
th
 Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party in 1999, taking the form of an official document known as the Decision 
of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of China on Major 
Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises. 
In accordance with this Decision, encouragement would be given to the 
establishment and development of giant state-owned conglomerates in the 
form of „trans-regional, trans-industrial, trans-ownership and transnational 
large enterprise groups‟;109 small-size state-owned enterprises would be 
prompted to develop themselves in some more innovative forms, eg by means 
of „regrouping, association, merger, leasing, contract-based management, 
shareholding, and sale‟.110 This suggests that the Chinese government tended 
to focus on controlling those most sizable state-owned enterprises; small and 
medium state-owned enterprises would gradually be de-nationalised and most 
likely become privatised at last.   
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In light of some scholars‟ view, transforming state-owned enterprises 
could be approached from various angles, such as ensuring their independent 
corporate personality, allowing freedom of transacting the property rights of 
state-owned enterprises, absorbing outside capital as equity into state-owned 
enterprises from diversified sources (eg indigenous funds injected by non-
public sectors, private individuals and organisations; foreign direct 
investment), out of which it has been particularly stressed that reforming 
property rights shall play a pivotal role.
111
  It is against this background that 
China‟s Company Law was enacted in 1993 and had been revised several 
times thereafter. Under this Company Law, one of the general types of 
company allowed to be set up in China is a company limited by shares.
112
 
Such availability of incorporating a business vehicle to become a company 
limited by shares creates an opportunity for a state-owned enterprise to be 
transformed into a body corporate that could operate in another form of 
ownership, eg private ownership, multi-ownership, or foreign ownership. 
More significantly,  apart from the Company Law, it has been made known to 
the public through the official source that China‟s state-owned enterprises in 
the future are to be subsumed into two major categories: (i) a public welfare 
type (this type of enterprise will be mainly engaged in the fields of 
petrochemicals, power grids, telecommunications services, supply of water 
and gas, waste water treatment, public transportation services, etc; it enjoys 
certain monopoly powers in the market due to its public welfare character.); 
and (ii) a multi-ownership type (this type of enterprise has no monopoly 
power and will normally be floated on stock exchanges with its share capital 
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open for public subscription and trading.)
113
 Obviously, a general trend in the 
overall scale of state-owned enterprises is to tail off in terms of quantity. 
However, there are discordant views opposing the theory that property 
right is the main cause to be blamed for bruising the development viability 
and potential of state-owned enterprises.
114
 They retort that property right in 
the form of state ownership is not necessarily synonymous with low 
efficiency; a well-performing enterprise need not be subject to a precondition 
that it must to a certain extent be privately-owned.
115
  
While different opinions clash with one another, the contention has not 
stymied the go-ahead of overhauling state-owned enterprises, especially those 
seemingly poorly performing and moribund ones; nevertheless, in the course 
of transforming them, the drainage of state assets could have been startling in 
some places.
116
 Some insiders acquired state-owned enterprises at a low price 
under the guise of accomplishing a securitisation scheme to absorb private 
capital in order to buy out state assets or to have the state‟s hold on assets 
become diluted.
117
 In such a way, they became the controllers of the 
enterprises, the original ownership of which had been artfully altered to the 
effect tallying with their desire through plotted transactions, the typical modus 
operandi known as carrying out mergers and acquisitions via MBOs 
(management buyouts).
118
 Reforming state-owned enterprises, though under 
certain circumstances a euphemistic way of saying „privatisation‟, is not 
supposed to generate a consequence whose backlash may on certain scales not 
only have injured the integrity and healthiness of the economy but also 
tarnished the cardinal spirit of justice and the rule of law which in today‟s 
time in China particularly needs to be staunchly advocated.  
But in practice, many people are reluctant to pursue such kind of cases 
further, other than turning the page on the past by treating it as a price that 
must be paid for China‟s reform experiments. Moreover, even in the event of 
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suspected cases, there are not ample mechanisms at present that could really 
help to effectively corroborate the suspicion. Illicit private assets could thus 
have been hidden under the umbrella of „equal protection‟, patently shielded 
from facing the risk of denudation by the state. Also discouragingly, there are 
limitations periods for crimes in China. Under China‟s Criminal Law, an 
offender can be exempt from prosecution after a certain period expires; the 
limitations periods include „(1) five years, when the maximum punishment 
prescribed is fixed-term imprisonment of less than five years; (2) 10 years, 
when the maximum punishment prescribed is fixed-term imprisonment of not 
less than five years but less than 10 years; (3) 15 years, when the maximum 
punishment prescribed is fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years; 
and (4) 20 years, when the maximum punishment prescribed is life 
imprisonment or death penalty…‟119 In other words, once such a specific 
period elapses, it could become fiendishly difficult, if not absolutely 
impossible, to have the wrongdoers brought to justice and their illegal gains 
disgorged. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
China‟s legal and economic regimes, though architected and adjusted 
from time to time to square with the political tendencies prevailing in different 
historical epochs, have basically never missed the point of safeguarding the 
rights to legitimate private property. Institutionalising the equal protection of 
private property in parallel to public assets serves the purpose of 
accommodating the need arising from today‟s situation. However, it may face 
both realistic and potential pitfalls. Thus far, China has not been able to 
launch a unified, mandatory personal assets declaration system for officials 
and senior officers working in state-owned enterprises and publicly funded 
organisations. Unless a sound mechanism is well established and 
unadulteratedly enforced so that unlawful private wealth can be forcibly 
stemmed and gradually but efficaciously eliminated, advocating the tenet of 
equal protection will entail little real significance in regard of justifiably 
providing protection to private assets on the basis of the rule of law. On the 
other hand, reforming China‟s ownership system by unbinding the 
private economy ought not to be simply construed and engineered as a U-turn 
against the merits of socialism. Protecting private property is by no means to 
demote the status of public ownership system which is still a central pillar in 
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China‟s economic and political foundations at present. An umbilical cord is 
inherently tying protecting private property to sticking to justice and 
egalitarianism, the latter being a key basis on which China‟s relevant legal 
and economic institutions have been developed into the current shape from 
the past. Building up a socialist nation with Chinese characteristics is the road 
of development that China chooses to follow; the next is to see how „common 
prosperity‟ could be achieved at the earliest time congruent with Deng 
Xiaoping‟s theory.120 In that sense, perhaps only when a golden ratio between 
ensuring the inviolability of private property and securing the realisation of 
justice and egalitarianism which the socialist core value venerates is located, 
would the nutrients in the soil where protecting private property is rooted 
come close to the level of sufficiency as faithfully envisaged. 
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